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Abstract. Although reference dependence plays a central role in explaining behavior, little
is known about the way that reference points are selected. This paper identiﬁes empirically
which reference point people use in decision under risk. We assume a comprehensive
reference-dependent model that nests the main reference-dependent theories, including
prospect theory, and that allows for isolating the reference point rule from other behavioral
parameters. Our experiment involved high stakes with payoffs up to a week’s salary. We
used an optimal design to select the choices in the experiment and Bayesian hierarchical
modeling for estimation. The most common reference points were the status quo and a
security level (the maximum of the minimal outcomes of the prospects in a choice). We
found little support for the use of expectations-based reference points.
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1. Introduction
Akey insight of behavioral decisionmaking is that people
evaluate outcomes as gains and losses from a reference
point. Reference dependence is central in prospect theory,
the most inﬂuential descriptive theory of decision under
risk, and it plays a crucial role in explaining people’s
attitudes toward risk (Rabin 2000, Wakker 2010). Evi-
dence abounds, from both the laboratory and the ﬁeld,
that preferences are reference dependent.1
A fundamental problem of prospect theory and other
reference-dependent theories is that they are unclear
about the way that reference points are formed. Back
in 1952, Markowitz (1952, p. 157) already remarked
about customary wealth, which plays the role of the ref-
erence point in his analysis: “It would be convenient if
I had a formula from which customary wealth could be
calculated when this was not equal to present wealth.
But I do not have such a rule and formula.” Tversky and
Kahneman (1991, pp. 1046–1047) argued that “although
the reference point usually corresponds to the decision
maker’s current position it can also be inﬂuenced by as-
pirations, expectations, norms, and social comparisons.”
This lack of clarity is undesirable, because it creates extra
freedom in deriving predictions, making it impossible to
rigorously test reference-dependent theories empirically.2
Reviewing the literature more than 60 years after
Markowitz (1952), Barberis (2013, p. 192) concludes
that addressing the formation of the reference point is
still a key challenge to apply prospect theory.
Empirical studies on the formation of reference points
are scarce, and their message is mixed. Some evidence3 is
consistent with a stochastic reference point that is based
on people’s expectations as in the model of Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) and the closely related disappointment
model of Delquié and Cillo (2006), but other evidence is
not.4 Moreover, the interpretation of the available evi-
dence is often unclear, because the data can be consistent
with several reference points simultaneously.5
This paper explores how people form their reference
point in decision under risk. Guided by the available
literature, we speciﬁed six reference point rules, andwe
estimated the support for each of these in a high-stakes
experiment with payments up to a week’s salary. The
selected rules vary depending on whether they are
choice speciﬁc (the reference point is determined by
the choice set) or prospect speciﬁc (the reference point
is determined by the prospect itself), whether they are
stochastic or deterministic, andwhether they are deﬁned
only by the outcome dimension or by both the out-
come and the probability dimension. Out-of-sample
93
predictions indicated that these rules covered the pref-
erences of our subjects well.
All of the reference points that we consider can be
identiﬁed through choices, and we work within the re-
vealed preference paradigm. We do not require in-
trospective data, whichmakes it easy to apply these rules
in practical decision analysis. In this, we follow Rabin
(2013),whoargues that newmodels aremaximallyuseful
if they are “portable” and use the same independent
variables as existing models. The core model of decision
under risk is expected utility, which only uses probabili-
ties and outcomes as independent variables. All of our
reference point rules can also be derived from probabili-
ties and outcomes, and they are, therefore, portable.
Wedeﬁneacomprehensivereference-dependentmodel
that includes the main reference-dependent theories as
special cases. In our model, the reference point is a pa-
rameter, which we can estimate just as any other model
parameter.6 This allows for comparing reference point
rules ceteris paribus (i.e., to isolate the reference point rule
from the speciﬁcation of the other behavioral parameters,
like utility curvature, probabilityweighting, and loss aver-
sion).WeuseaBayesianhierarchicalmodeltoestimateeach
subject’s reference point rule. Bayesianmodeling estimates
the individual-speciﬁc parameters by accounting for sim-
ilarities between individuals in the population. Several
recent studies have shown that Bayesian hierarchical
modeling leads to more precise estimates of prospect
theory’s parameters and prevents inference from being
dominatedbyoutliers(Nilssonetal.2011,Murphyand ten
Brincke 2018). We show how Bayesian hierarchical
modeling can also be used to estimate the reference
point rule that subjects use. Choices were optimally
designed to maximize the orthogonality between ques-
tions so as to obtain more precise and robust estimates.
Our results indicate that two reference point rules
standout: the StatusQuo andMaxMin, a security-based
rule according to which subjects adopt the maximum
outcome that they can reach for sure as their reference
point (Schneider and Day 2018). Together, these two ref-
erence points account for the behavior of over 60% of our
subjects.Wefound little support for theuseof theprospect
itself as a reference point, the only rule in our study with
a stochastic reference point, and at most, 20% of our
subjects used an expectations-based reference point rule
(the prospect itself or the expected value of the prospect).
2. Theoretical Background
A prospect is a probability distribution over money
amounts. Simple prospects assign probability 1 to a ﬁnite
set of outcomes. We denote these simple prospects as
(p1, x1; . . . ; pn, xn), which means that they pay $xj with
probability pj, j  1, . . . ,n.We identify simple prospects
with their cumulative distribution functions and de-
note them with capital Roman letters (F, G). The de-
cision maker has a weak preference relation ≽ over
the set of prospects, and as usual, we denote strict
preference by _, indifference by ~ , and the reversed
preferences by7 and3. The function Vdeﬁned from
the set of simple prospects to the reals represents ≽ if,
for all prospects F,G, F≽G is equivalent toV (F)≥V (G).
Outcomes are deﬁned as gains and losses relative to a
reference point r. An outcome x is a gain if x> r and a loss
if x< r.
2.1. Prospect Theory
Under prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992),7
there exist probability weighting functions w+and w− for
gains and losses and a nondecreasing gain-loss utility
function U :R→R with U(0)  0 such that preferences
are represented by
F→PTr (F) 
∫
x≥r
U(x − r)dw+(1 − F)
+
∫
x≤r
U(x − r)dw−(F).
(1)
The integrals in Equation (1) are Lebesgue integrals with
respect to distorted measures w+(1 − F) and w−(F). For
losses theweighting applies to the cumulative distribution
F, and for gains to the decumulative distribution 1 − F.
The functionsw+ andw− are nondecreasing andmap
probabilities into [0,1] with wi(0)  0, wi(1)  1, i  +,−.
When the functions wi are linear, PT reduces to expected
utility with reference-dependent utility:
F→EUr (F) 
∫
U(x − r)dF. (2)
Equation (2) shows that reference dependence by itself
does not violate expected utility as long as the reference
point is held ﬁxed (see also Schmidt 2003).
Basedonempirical observations, Tversky andKahneman
(1992) hypothesized speciﬁc shapes for the functions
U,w+, andw−. The gain-loss utilityU is S shaped: concave
for gains and convex for losses. It is steeper for losses
than for gains to capture loss aversion, the ﬁnding that
losses loom larger than gains. The probability weighting
functions are inverse S shaped, reﬂecting overweighting
of small probabilities and underweighting of middle
and large probabilities.
2.2. Stochastic Reference Points
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) deﬁned prospect theory
for a riskless reference point r. Sugden (2003) introduced
twomodiﬁcations to Equation (2). First, he allowed for a
stochastic reference point, and second, he suggested a
decomposition of utility into a function v, which reﬂects
the decision maker’s absolute evaluation of outcomes
(independent of the reference point), and a function U,
which reﬂects his attitude toward gains and losses of
utility. Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) interpreted v as
reﬂecting the normative component of utility. Following
up on the suggestion of Sugden (2003), Ko¨szegi and
Baillon, Bleichrodt, and Spinu: Searching for the Reference Point
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Rabin (2006, 2007) proposed the following representa-
tion of preferences over prospects F:
F→KRR (F) 
∫
v(x)dF +
∫ ∫
U(v(x) − v(r))dFdR. (3)
The ﬁrst term ∫ v(x)dF represents the decision maker’s
(expected) consumption utility. As in the disappoint-
mentmodels described below, Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006,
2007) allowed the reference point to be prospect speciﬁc
(i.e., to differ between the prospects in the choice set).
Unlike models with a choice-speciﬁc reference point
(common to all prospects in the choice set), consumption
utility is crucial for models with a prospect-speciﬁc
reference point to rule out implausible choice behavior.
We give an example of such implausible choice behavior
in Endnote 8. Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007) deﬁned con-
sumption utility over ﬁnal wealth. In our study, the
subjects’ initial wealth remained constant, and we,
therefore, omit it and equate ﬁnal wealthwith outcome.
In empirical applications, consumption utility is
usually taken to be linear (e.g., Heidhues and Kőszegi
2008, Abeler et al. 2011, Gill and Prowse 2012, Eil and
Lien 2014). Even if v is not linear over ﬁnal wealth, the
outcomes used in our study represent marginal in-
creases of wealth, thereby justifying us to approximate
v(x) by x. Then, Equation (3) becomes
KRR(F) 
∫
xdF +
∫
EUr (F)dR. (4)
Although prospect theory does not specify the ref-
erence point, Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007) presented a
theory in which reference points are determined by the
decision maker’s rational expectations. They distinguish
two speciﬁcations of the reference point: one prospect
speciﬁc and one choice speciﬁc. In a choice-acclimating
personal equilibrium (CPE), the reference point is the pros-
pect itself. This prospect-speciﬁc reference point gives8
KR (F) 
∫
xdF +
∫
EUx (F)dF. (5)
In a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE), the reference
point is choice speciﬁc and equal to the preferred prospect
in the choice set.
There is no probability weighting in Equation (4). It is
unclear how the rational expectations reference point
should be deﬁned in the presence of probability weight-
ing. Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) do not address this
problem and leave out probability weighting, although
they acknowledge its relevance (Ko¨szegi and Rabin 2006,
footnote 2, p. 1137). For a version of prospect theorywith a
stochastic reference point and probability weighting, see
Schmidt et al. (2008).
2.3. Disappointment Models
The model of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) is close to
the disappointment models of Bell (1985), Loomes and
Sugden (1986), Gul (1991), and Delquié and Cillo (2006).
The model of Bell (1985) is equivalent to Equation (3),
with v(r) replaced by the expected consumption value of
the prospect (although Bell (1985) remarks that this may
be too restrictive and also presents amore generalmodel),
the model of Loomes and Sugden (1986) is equiva-
lent to Equation (3) with v(r) replaced by the expected
consumption utility of the prospect,9 and the model of
Gul (1991) is equivalent to Equation (3) with v(r) replaced
by the certainty equivalent of the prospect. The model
of Delquié and Cillo (2006) is identical to the CPEmodel
of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007) (Equation (5)). Masatlioglu
and Raymond (2016) formally characterize the link
between the CPE model of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007),
the disappointment models, and other generalizations
of expected utility. They show that, if the gain-loss utility
function U is linear and the decision maker satisﬁes ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance,CPE is equal to the intersection
between rank-dependent utility (Quiggin 1981, 1982) and
quadratic utility (Machina 1982; Chew et al. 1991, 1994).
2.4. General Reference-dependent Speciﬁcation
To isolate the reference point, we must use the same
model speciﬁcation across all reference point rules.
That is, all other behavioral parameters must enter the
model in the sameway regardless of the reference point
rule. To address this ceteris paribus principle, we adopt
the following general reference-dependent model:
F→RD (F) 
∫
xdF +
∫
PTr (F) dR. (6)
Equation (6) contains prospect theory (Equation (1)),
the model of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) (Equation
(4)), and the disappointment models as special cases. In
Equation (6), probability weighting plays a role in the
psychological part of the model (the second term in the
sum), but it does not affect consumption utility (the ﬁrst
term).Thisseemsreasonable,becauseconsumptionutility
reﬂects the “rational” part of utility and because proba-
bility weighting is usually considered a deviation from
rationality. Adjusting the model to also include proba-
bility weighting in consumption utility is straightforward.
Probability weighting does not affect the (stochastic) re-
ference points either. In this, we follow the literature on sto-
chastic reference points (Sugden 2003; Delquié and Cillo
2006; Ko¨szegi and Rabin 2006, 2007; Schmidt et al. 2008).
We will consider alternative speciﬁcations in Section 6.4.
3. Reference Point Rules
A reference point rule speciﬁes for each choice situation
which reference point is used. Table 1 summarizes the
reference point rules that we studied. We distinguish ref-
erence point rules along three dimensions. First, we dis-
tinguish whether they are prospect speciﬁc, in which case
each prospect has its own reference point, or choice speciﬁc,
in which case there is a common reference point for all
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prospectswithinachoice set. Second,wedistinguishwhether
the reference point is deterministic or stochastic. Third, we
distinguish whether the rules use only payoffs to determine
the reference point or both payoffs and probabilities.
The ﬁrst reference point rule is the Status Quo, which is
often used in experimental studies of reference depen-
dence. Our subjects knew that they would receive a
participation fee for sure. Consequently, we took the
participation fee as the StatusQuo reference point and any
extra money that subjects could win if one of their choices
was played out for real as a gain. Because all outcomes in
our experiment were strictly positive, with this reference
point, subjects could suffer no losses. Expected utility
maximization is the special case of Equation (6) with the
Status Quo reference point where subjects do not weight
probabilities. Expected value maximization is the special
case of expected utility with the Status Quo as the ref-
erence point where subjects have linear utility. The Status
Quo is a choice-speciﬁc reference point, because it leads to
the same reference point for all prospects in a choice set.
MaxMin, the second reference point rule, is based on
Hershey and Schoemaker (1985). They found that,
when asked for the probability p that made them in-
different between outcome z for sure and a prospect
(p, x1; 1 − p, x2), with x1 > z> x2, their subjects took z as
their reference point and perceived x1 − z as a gain and
x2 − z as a loss. Bleichrodt et al. (2001), van Osch et al.
(2004, 2006), and Van Osch and Stiggelbout (2008)
found similar evidence for such a strategy in medical
decisions. For example, vanOsch et al. (2006) asked their
subjects to think aloud while choosing. The most com-
mon reasoning in a choice between life duration z for sure
and a prospect (p, x1; 1 − p, x2)was “I can gain x − z years
if the gamble goes well or lose z − y if it doesn’t” van
Osch et al. (2006, table 1).
MaxMin generalizes the above line of reasoning to
the choice between any two prospects.10 It posits that,
in a comparison between two prospects, people look at
the minimum outcomes of the two prospects and take
the maximum of these as their reference point. This
reference point is the amount that they can obtain for sure.
For example, in a comparison between (0.50, 100; 0.50, 0)
and (0.25, 75; 0.75, 25), the minimum outcomes are 0
and 25, and because 25 exceeds 0, MaxMin implies that
subjects take 25 as their reference point and view 75 and
100 as gains and 0 as a loss.
MaxMin is a cautious rule and implies that peo-
ple are looking for security. MinMax is the bold
counterpart of MaxMin. A MinMax decision maker
looks at the maximal opportunities and takes the
minimum of the maximum outcomes as his reference
point. Hence, MinMax predicts that the decision maker
will take 75 as his reference point when choosing between
(0.50, 100; 0.50, 0) and (0.25, 75; 0.75, 25) and perceives
100 as a gain and 25 and 0 as losses.
The MaxMin and the MinMax rules both look at
extreme outcomes. One reason is that these outcomes
are salient. Another salient outcome is the payoff with
the highest probability, and our next rule, X at Max P,
uses this outcome as the reference point. The impor-
tance of salience is widely documented in cognitive
psychology (Kahneman 2011). Barber and Odean (2008)
and Chetty et al. (2009) show the effect of salience on
economic decisions. Bordalo et al. (2012) present a theory
of salience in decision under risk.
The ﬁnal two reference points that we considered are
the Expected Value of the prospect, such as in the dis-
appointment models of Bell (1985) and Loomes and
Sugden (1986),11 and the Prospect Itself, such as in the
disappointment model of Delquié and Cillo (2006) and
the CPE model of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007). Unlike the
other reference points, these reference points are pros-
pect speciﬁc. The prospect itself is the only rule that
speciﬁes a stochastic reference point. If the prospect itself
is the reference point, then the decision maker will, for
example, reframe the prospect (0.50, 100; 0.50, 0) as a 25%
chance to gain 100 (if he wins 100 and 0 is the refer-
ence point, the probability of this happening is 0.50×
0.50  0.25), a 25% chance to lose 100 (if he wins nothing
and 100 is the reference point), and a 50% chance that
he wins or loses nothing (if either he wins 100 and 100
is the reference point, or he wins nothing and nothing
is the reference point). The decision maker’s gain–loss
utility is then w+(.25)U(100) + w−(.25)U(−100).
Two points are worth making. First, Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2007) propose the CPE model to describe choices
with large time delays between choice and outcome,
like for example, in insurance decisions. We use the
CPE model outside this speciﬁc context as did others
before us (e.g., Rosato and Tymula 2016), because it is
tractable, both theoretically and empirically. Second,
we do not consider the rule that speciﬁes that the
Table 1. The Reference Point Rules Studied in This Paper
Prospect/choice speciﬁc Stochastic Uses probability
Status Quo Choice No No
MaxMin Choice No No
MinMax Choice No No
X at Max P Choice No Yes
Expected Value Prospect No Yes
Prospect Itself Prospect Yes Yes
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preferred prospect in a choice is used as the reference
point, such as in the PPE model of Ko¨szegi and Rabin
(2007), because the model in Equation (6) is then de-
ﬁned recursively and cannot be estimated.
4. Experiment
4.1. Subjects and Payoffs
The subjects were 139 students and employees from the
Technical University of Moldova (49 females, age range
of 17–47 years old, average age 22 years old). They
received a 50 Lei participation fee (about $4, which was
$8 in purchasing power parity at the time of the ex-
periment). Toincentivizetheexperiment,eachsubjecthad
a one-third chance to be selected to play out one of their
choices for real.Thechoice thatwasplayedout for realwas
randomlydetermined.Ouranalysisassumedthat subjects
consider each choice in isolation from the other choices
andfromtheone-thirdchancethat theywouldbeselected
to play out one of their choices for real. This assumption
is common in experimental economics, and there exists
supportfor it(StarmerandSugden1991,Cubittetal.1998,
Bardsley et al. 2010).12 The subjects did not know the
outcomesof theprospects tocome,preventingthemfrom
evaluating the experiment as a single prospect.
The payoffs were substantial. The subjects who
played out their choices for real earned 330 Lei on av-
erage, whichwasmore than one-half the averageweek’s
salary in Moldova at the time of the experiment. Two
subjects won about 600 Lei, the average week’s salary.
4.2. Procedure
The experiment was computer run in group ses-
sions of 10–15 subjects. Subjects took 30 minutes on
average to complete the experiment, including
instructions.
Subjects made 70 choices in total. The 70 choices are
listed in Appendix A, including the reference points pre-
dicted by each of the rules. The different rules predicted
widely different reference points, and the predicted
reference points varied substantially across choices (ex-
cept, of course, for the Status Quo).
Each choice involved two options: Option 1 and
Option 2. The options had between one and four
possible outcomes, all strictly positive tomake sure that
subjects would not leave the experiment having lost
money. Note that under ﬁve of the six reference point
rules (the exception is the Status Quo), some strictly
positive outcomeswill be perceived as losses depending
on the reference point. We randomized the order of the
choices, and we also randomized whether a prospect
was presented as Option 1 or Option 2.
The selection of choices ensured the complete cov-
erage of the outcome and probability space and a
balanced pairing of prospects with different numbers
of outcomes to avoid favoring speciﬁc reference point
rules. Eight homogeneous groups of choices were
created, with each group containing all possible choices
from a 20 × 20 outcome probability grid.Within each of
these groups, a computationally intensive optimal design
procedure that minimized the total pairwise correlation
between choices was applied to arrive at the ﬁnal much
smaller set of choices. The intuition behind the optimal
design procedure is that, just like with orthogonal
covariates in linear regression, minimally correlated
choices should lead to more efﬁcient and more robust
estimates of the behavioral parameters. The procedure
Figure 1. (Color online) Presentation of the Choices in the Experiment
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for the construction of the homogeneous groups of
questions and the computational details of the optimal
design are provided in Appendix B.
Figure 1 shows how the choices were displayed.
Prospects were presented as horizontal bars with as
many parts as there were different payoffs. The size of
each part correspondedwith the probability of the payoff.
The intensity of the color (blue) of each part increased
with the size of the payoff. The payoffs were presented
in increasing order. Subjects were asked to click on a
bullet to indicate their preferred option (Figure 1 illus-
trates a choice for Option 2).
5. Bayesian Hierarchical Modeling
We analyzed the data using Bayesian hierarchical
modeling. Economic analyses of choice behavior usually
estimate models either by treating all data as generated
by the representative agent or by independent estima-
tion of each subject’s parameters from the data collected
from that speciﬁc subject. Both approaches have their
limitations. Representative agent aggregation ignores
individual heterogeneity and may result in esti-
mates that are not representative of any individual in
the sample. Individual-level estimation relies on rela-
tively few data points, which may lead to unreliable
results. Hierarchical modeling is an appealing com-
promise between these two extremes (Rouder and Lu
2005). It estimates themodel parameters for each subject
separately, but it assumes that subjects share similarities
and that their individual parameter values come from
a common (population-level) distribution. Hence, the
parameter estimates for one individual beneﬁt from
the information obtained from all others. This improves
the precision of the estimates (in Bayesian statistics, this
is known as collective inference), and it reduces the impact
of outliers. Individual parameters are shrunk toward the
groupmean, an effect that is stronger for individualswith
noisier behavior or individuals with fewer data points,
thus making the overall estimation more robust. This is
particularly true for parameters that are estimated with
lower precision.An example is the loss aversion coefﬁcient
in prospect theory, for which the standard error of the
parameter estimates is usually high. Nilsson et al. (2011)
and Murphy and ten Brincke (2018) illustrate that
Bayesian hierarchical modeling leads tomore accurate,
efﬁcient, and reliable estimates of loss aversion than the
commonly used maximum likelihood estimation.
Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of our
statistical model. Details of the estimation procedure
are in Appendix C. The model consists of two parts:
ﬁrst, the speciﬁcation of the behavioral parameters
Bi, i∈ {1, .., 139} in Equation (6), which includes utility,
probability weighting, and the loss aversion parameter;
second, the speciﬁcation of the reference point rule
RPi, i∈ {1, .., 139}. The reference point rule is one of
the candidates listed in Table 1. Our analysis will
estimate the posterior probabilities of a subject using
each of the different reference point rules. In that sense,
our analysis does allow for the possibility that subjects
use a mixture of reference point rules.
The distributions of the behavioral parameters and
the reference point rules in the population are param-
eterized by unknown vectors θB and θRP, respectively.
Both θB and θRP are estimated from the data. The pa-
rametersθB and θRP also follow a distribution butwith a
known shape. This ﬁnal layer in the hierarchical spec-
iﬁcation is commonly referred to as a hyperprior. The
hyperpriors are denoted by πB and πRP, respectively.
It is worth pointing out that the above joint prior for
all unknown parameters presumes that the latent
variable RPi is independent from the behavioral pa-
rameter Bi. Although this is true for the prior distri-
bution,RPi and Bi are not independent in the posterior.13
Just like we specify a ﬂat (noninformative) prior for
parameters for which we are agnostic about their values
in the real world, we specify a joint independence for
multivariate dependencies for which we do not know
the true relationship. Because estimation in the Bayesian
framework provides us with the full joint distribution of
unknown parameters, investigating correlations in the
joint posterior can provide useful insights into the re-
lationship of these parameters in the real-world systems.
We assume that the utility functionU in Equation (6)
is a power function:
U(x) 
{ (x − r)α if x≥ r
−λ(r − x)α if x< r. (7)
Figure 2. (Color online) Graphical Representation of Our
Model
Note. Nonshaded nodes are known or predeﬁned quantities, and
shaded nodes are the unknown latent parameters.
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In Equation (7), α reﬂects the curvature of utility, and
λ indicates loss aversion. We assumed the same cur-
vature for gains and losses, because the estimations of
loss aversion can be substantially biased when utility
curvature for gains and losses can both vary freely
(Nilsson et al. 2011).
For probability weighting, we assumed the one-
parameter speciﬁcation of Prelec (1998):
w (p)  e(−(−ln p)γ). (8)
We used the same probability weighting for gains
and losses. Empirical studies usually ﬁnd that the dif-
ferences in probability weighting between gains and
losses are relatively small (Tversky andKahneman 1992,
Abdellaoui 2000, Kothiyal et al. 2014).
To account for the probabilistic nature of people’s
choices, we used the logistic choice rule of Luce (1959).
Let RD( F) and RD(G) denote the values of prospects F
and G, respectively, according to our general reference-
dependent model (Equation (6)). Luce’s choice rule
(1959) says that the probability P(F,G) of choosing pros-
pect F over prospect G equals
P(F,G)  1
1 + eξ[RD(G)−RD(F)] . (9)
In Equation (9), ξ> 0 is a precision parameter that
measures the extent to which the decision maker’s
choices are determined by the differences in value
between the prospects. In other words, the ξ parameter
signals the quality of the decision. Larger values of ξ
imply that choice is drivenmore by the value difference
between prospects F and G. If ξ  0, choice is random,
and if ξ goes to inﬁnity, choice essentially becomes de-
terministic. In his comprehensive exploration of prospect
theory speciﬁcations, Stott (2006) concluded that power
utility, the one-parameter probability weighting function
of Prelec (1998), and the choice rule of Luce (1959) gave
the best ﬁt to his data for gains. We, therefore, selected
these speciﬁcations.
To test for robustness, we also ran our analysis with
exponential utility, the two-parameter speciﬁcation of
the weighting function of Prelec (1998), and an alterna-
tive incomplete regularized β function (IBeta) probability
weighting function (Wilcox 2012). IBeta is a ﬂexible, two-
parameter family that can accommodate many shapes
(convex, concave, S shaped, and inverse S shaped); see
Appendix D and the online appendix for details. The
robustness analyses conﬁrmed ourmain conclusions. The
results of these analyses are in the online appendix.
6. Results
6.1. Consistency
To test for consistency, ﬁve choices were asked twice.
In 68.7% of these repeated choices, subjects made
the same choice. Reversal rates up to one-third are
common in experiments (Stott 2006). Moreover, our
choices were complex, involving more than two out-
comes and with expected values that were close. The
median number of reversals was one; 20% of the
subjects made at least three reversals, and the number
of reversals that they made accounted for 41% of the
total number of reversals. We also recorded the time
that subjects spent on making their choices. The av-
erage time that they spent was not correlated with the
reversal rate. An advantage of Bayesian analysis is that
subjects who were particularly prone to make errors
received little weight. For these subjects, the estimated
parameters will be closer to the population averages.
Two questions had one option stochastically domi-
nating the other; 108 subjects always chose the dominant
options, 27 chose it once, and 4 never chose it. The time
spent on these questions (and also the time spent on all
questions) by subjects violating stochastic dominance at
least once did not signiﬁcantly differ from the time spent
by the subjectswho never violated stochastic dominance.
6.2. Reference Points
We ﬁrst report the estimates of θRP, which indicate for
each reference point rule the probability that a randomly
chosen subject behaved in agreement with it. Figure 3
shows for each RP rule the marginal posterior distribu-
tion of θRP in the population. Table 2 reports the medians
and standard deviations of these distributions.14
The reference points that were most likely to be used
were the Status Quo and MaxMin. According to our
median estimates, each of these two rules was used by
30% of the subjects. The prospect itself (the rule sug-
gested by Delquié and Cillo (2006) and Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007)) was used by 20% of the subjects.
The other three rules were used rarely.
We also estimated for each subject the likelihood that
they used a speciﬁc reference point by looking at their
posterior distribution. Figure 4 shows, for example, the
posterior distributions of subjects 17, 50, and 100. Subject
17 has about 60% probability to use the prospect itself as
reference point and a 25% probability to use MinMax.
Subject 50 almost surely uses MaxMin, and subject 100
almost surely uses the Status Quo as reference point.
Subjects were classiﬁed sharply if they had a posterior
probability of at least 50% to use one of the six reference
point rules. For example, subjects 17, 50, and 100 were
all classiﬁed sharply. Subjects who could not be clas-
siﬁed sharply might use different rules across choices,
or they might not behave according to Equation (6): for
example, because they used some choice heuristic. Of
the 139 subjects, 107 could be classiﬁed sharply.15
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the sharply classiﬁed
subjects over the six reference point rules. The domi-
nance of the Status Quo andMaxMin increased further,
and around 70% of the sharply classiﬁed subjects used
one of these two rules.
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6.3. Behavioral Parameters
Figure 6 shows the gain-loss utility function in the
psychological (PT) part of Equation (6) based on the
estimated behavioral population-level parameters (θB).
The utility function was S shaped: concave for gains
and convex for losses. We found more utility curvature
than most previous estimations of gain-loss utility (for
an overview, see Fox and Poldrack 2014), but our es-
timated utility function is no outlier. It is, for example,
close to the functions estimated by Wu and Gonzalez
(1996), Gonzalez and Wu (1999), and Toubia et al.
(2013). The loss aversion coefﬁcient was equal to 2.34,
which is consistent with other ﬁndings in the literature.
Figure 7 shows the estimated probability weighting
function in the subject population. The function has the
commonly observed inverse S shape, which reﬂects
overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting
of intermediate and large probabilities.16 Our estimated
probability weighting function is close to the estimated
functions in Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Bleichrodt and
Pinto (2000), and Toubia et al. (2013).
Bayesian hierarchical modeling expresses the un-
certainty in the individual parameter estimates by means
of the posterior densities. To illustrate, Figure 8 shows
the posterior densities of subject 17. As the graph shows,
subject 17’s parameter estimates varied considerably,
although it is safe to say that he had concave utility and
inverse S-shaped probability weighting.
Table 3 shows the quantiles of the posterior point
estimates of all 139 subjects. The table shows that utility
curvature and to a lesser extent, probability weighting
were rather stable across subjects. Loss aversion varied
muchmore, although the estimates ofmore than 75% of
the subjects were consistent with loss aversion.
Table 4 shows the median behavioral parameters of
the sharply classiﬁed subjects subdivided by reference
point rule. A priori, it seemed plausible that subjects
who used different rules might also have different be-
havioral parameters, in particular loss aversion. The
table conﬁrms this conjecture. Although utility curva-
ture andprobabilityweightingwere rather stable across
thegroups, the lossaversioncoefﬁcientsvariedfrom0.50
in the MinMax group to 2.44 in the Expected Value
group. The loss aversion coefﬁcient of 0.50 in theMinMax
group has the interesting interpretation that these opti-
mistic subjects weight gains twice as much as losses,
and they exhibit what might be seen as the reﬂection of
Figure 3. (Color online) Marginal Posterior Distributions of Each Reference Point Rule
Table 2. Medians and Standard Deviations of the Marginal
Posterior Distributions of the Reference Point Rules
Median Standard deviation
Status Quo 0.30 0.06
MaxMin 0.30 0.06
MinMax 0.10 0.04
X at Max P 0.01 0.02
Expected Value 0.06 0.04
Prospect Itself 0.20 0.06
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the preferences of the cautious MaxMin subjects who
weight losses more than twice as much as gains.
Table 4 also shows that subjects who used the Status
Quo as their reference point were typically not expected
utility maximizers, because there was substantial prob-
ability weighting in this group. Table 5 gives a more
detailed overview. It shows the subdivision of the sub-
jects who used the Status Quo as their reference point
Figure 4. (Color online) Posterior Distributions of Subjects 17, 50, and 100
Figure 5. (Color online) Proportion of Sharply Classiﬁed Respondents Satisfying a Particular Reference Point Rule
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based on the 95% Bayesian credible intervals of their
estimated utility curvature and probability weighting
parameters. Twelve subjects (those with γ  1) behaved
according to expected utility, three of whom (those with
α  1 and γ  1) were expected valuemaximizers. Thus,
less than 10% of our subjects were expected utility
maximizers.
Figure 9 displays the correlation matrix of the esti-
mated behavioral parameters and the reference point
rules. The correlations between the behavioral pa-
rameters (α,γ,λ, and ξ) are small. There is a slight
tendency for more loss-averse subjects to choose more
randomly. The correlations between the reference point
rules and the behavioral parameters are largely con-
sistent with the ﬁndings reported in Table 4. Status Quo
and MinMax are associated with lower loss aversion,
whereas the opposite is true for MaxMin and Prospect
Itself. The reported correlations for X at Max P and
Expected Value should be interpreted with caution,
because the probability of using these rules was
very low.
6.4. Robustness
In the main analysis, we assumed Equation (6) for all
reference point rules, allowing us to keep all behavioral
parameters constant when comparing reference point
rules. We also tried several other speciﬁcations, which
are summarized in Table 6. Model 1 corresponds to the
results reported in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. The two vari-
ables that we varied in the robustness checks were
the inclusion of consumption utility and probability
weighting. Although models with prospect-speciﬁc
reference points need consumption utility to rule out
implausible choice behavior, models with a choice-
speciﬁc reference point do not. Prospect theory, for
example, does not include consumption utility. Con-
sequently, we estimated the models with a choice-
speciﬁc reference point both with and without con-
sumption utility.
In Equation (6), we assumed that subjects weight
probabilities when they evaluate prospects relative to a
reference point, but following the literature on sto-
chastic reference points, we abstracted from probability
weighting in the determination of the stochastic ref-
erence point. This may be arbitrary, and we, therefore,
also estimated the models without probability weight-
ing.We performed two sets of estimations: one in which
the models with a choice-speciﬁc reference point in-
cluded probability weighting, but the models with a
prospect-speciﬁc reference point did not (Models 3 and
4) and one inwhich nomodel had probability weighting
(Models 5 and 6).
The results of the robustness checks were as follows.
First, our main conclusion that the Status Quo and
MaxMin were the dominant reference points remained
valid. The behavior of 60%–75% of the subjects was best
described by a model with one of these two reference
points. Second, excluding consumption utility from
models with a choice-speciﬁc reference point (Models 2
and 4) led to a substantial increase in the precision pa-
rameter ξ. This suggests that there is no need to include
consumption utility in models like prospect theory.
Third, probability weighting played a crucial role.
Excluding probability weighting from the models with
a prospect-speciﬁc reference point (Model 3) decreased
the share of the Prospect Itself as a reference point to
10% (8% if we only include the sharply classiﬁed
subjects) and increased the share of the MaxMin ref-
erence point to 44% (52% if we only include the sharply
classiﬁed subjects). The shares of the other rules
changed only little. Hence, prospect-speciﬁc models,
like the disappointment aversion models and the
model of Ko¨szegi and Rabin’s (2006, 2007), beneﬁt from
including probability weighting. Ignoring probability
Figure 6. (Color online) The Gain-Loss Utility Function
Based on the Estimated Group Parameters
Figure 7. (Color online) The Probability Weighting
Function Based on the Estimated Group Parameters
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weighting altogether, as in Models 5 and 6, led to
unstable estimation results.
The behavioral parameters were comparable across
all models that we estimated. The power utility co-
efﬁcient was approximately 0.50 in all models, the
probability weighting parameter varied between 0.40
and 0.60 (except, of course,whennoprobabilityweighting
was assumed), and the loss aversion coefﬁcient varied
between 2 and 2.50. Detailed results of the robustness
analyses are in the online appendix.
6.5. Crossvalidation
Throughout the paper, we considered six reference
point rules. Although these rules cover many of the
rules that have been proposed in the literature and used
in empirical research, it might be that subjects adopted
another rule. In that case, the model would be mis-
speciﬁed, and it would poorly predict subjects’ choices.
Part of this is captured by restricting the analysis to the
sharply classiﬁed subjects, which as we explained above,
gave similar results.
To explore the predictive ability of our reference
points, we performed the following crossvalidation
exercise. We estimated the model on 69 questions
and predicted the choice made by each of the 139
subjects for the remaining question. This out-of-sample
prediction procedure was repeated 70 times, and each
question was used once as the choice to be predicted.
The reference point rules predicted around 70% of the
choices correctly. Given that the consistency rate was
also around 70%, we conclude that the rules that we
included captured our subjects’ preferences well and
that there is no indication that the model was mis-
speciﬁed. The part that could not be explained prob-
ably reﬂected noise.
7. Discussion
Empirical studies often assume that subjects take the
Status Quo as their reference point. Our results help to
assess the validity of that assumption; 30%–40% of our
subjects adopted the Status Quo as their reference
point. Amajority used a different reference point rule,
in particular MaxMin. Our data suggest ways to in-
crease the likelihood that subjects use the Status
Quo as their reference point. For example, experi-
ments involving mixed prospects could include a
prospect with zero as its minimum outcome in each
choice. Then, MaxMin subjects will also use zero as
Figure 8. Posterior Densities of the Behavioral Parameters for Subject 17
Notes. N denotes the number of simulations on which the densities are based. Bandwidth denotes the smoothing parameter for the kernel
density estimation.
Table 3. Quantiles of the Point Estimates of the Behavioral
Parameters of the 139 Subjects
2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
α 0.31 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.60
λ 0.36 1.19 1.59 2.25 4.63
γ 0.09 0.14 0.24 0.44 1.66
ξ 6.11 8.26 10.89 14.41 25.76
Table 4. Median Individual-Level Behavioral Parameters
for the Sharply Classiﬁed Subjects in Each Group
α γ λ ξ
Status Quo 0.42 0.28 1.51 11.75
MaxMin 0.46 0.24 2.24 10.30
MinMax 0.40 0.15 0.50 14.34
Expected Value 0.36 0.25 2.44 6.14
Prospect Itself 0.45 0.16 2.23 10.89
Notes. The reason that λ is not equal to one for subjects who were
sharply classiﬁed as using the Status Quo rulewas that, even for those
subjects, there was a nonnegligible probability that they used any of
the other reference point rules and were loss averse. X at Max P is
not in this table because there were no sharply classiﬁed subjects who
behaved according to this rule.
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their reference point, and our results suggest that,
consequently, a large majority of the subjects will use
zero as their reference point.
We used a Bayesian hierarchical approach to analyze
the data. Bayesian analysis strikes a nice balance between
representative agent and independent per subject es-
timation, and it leads to more precise parameter esti-
mates. A potential limitation of Bayesian analysis is that
the selected priors may in principle affect the estimations,
but the choice of priors, as is common, had a negligible
impact on the estimates in our analyses.
To make inferences about the different reference point
rules, we used a comprehensive model, which allowed
for isolating the impact of the reference point rule from
the other behavioral parameters. This approach is cleaner
and easier to interpret than the common practices of
using mixture models, where each model is speciﬁed
separately and parameterizations can differ acrossmodels,
or horse races between models based on criteria, such
as the Akaike Information Criterion. Hierarchical
models have the additional advantage that inference
can be done both at the aggregate level and for each
subject individually.
Our robustness tests have two interesting implica-
tions for reference-dependent models. First, they indi-
cate that models with a choice-speciﬁc reference point
do not beneﬁt from including consumption utility. This
suggests that the role of the absolute amounts of
money was limited and that our subjects were mainly
concerned about changes from the reference point.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 277) conjectured
that, although an individual’s attitudes to money
depend on both his asset position and changes from
his reference point, a utility function that is only
deﬁned over changes from the reference point gen-
erally provides a satisfactory approximation.17 Our re-
sults support their conjecture. Second, we conclude
that probability weighting could not be ignored. The
ﬁt of expectation-based models, like the disappoint-
ment aversion models and the model of Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2007), which in their original form, are lin-
ear in probabilities, clearly improved when probability
weighting was included.
In models with prospect-speciﬁc reference points,
the gain-loss utility component (the second term of
Equation (6)) can violate stochastic dominance. The in-
clusionof consumptionutility (theﬁrst termof Equation (6))
mitigates this problem but does not solve it. Masatlioglu
and Raymond (2016) showed that models that have the
prospect itself as the reference point, such as themodels
of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2007) and of Delquié and Cillo
(2006), can still suffer from violations of ﬁrst-order
stochastic dominance (unless, for instance, utility is
piecewise linear and 0≤λ≤ 2). The same problem ac-
tually occurs when subjects use the expected value as
their reference point. Unlike models with a prospect-
speciﬁc reference point, models with a choice-speciﬁc
Figure 9. (Color online) Correlations Between Behavioral Parameters and Estimated Reference Point Rules
Table 5. Behavioral Parameters of the Subjects Using the
Status Quo as Their Reference Points (Classiﬁcation into
Groups is Based on the 95% Bayesian Credible Intervals)
Utility
Probability weighting
γ< 1 γ  1 γ> 1 Total
α< 1 28 9 0 37
α  1 3 3 0 6
α> 1 0 0 0 0
Total 31 12 0 43
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reference point always satisfy ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance. Two choices in our experiment tested
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. Subjects who vio-
lated ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance at least once
were more likely to use a prospect-speciﬁc reference
point (they had a 12% chance to use Expected Value
and a 30% chance to use Prospect Itself) than subjects
who never violated it (5% chance Expected Value, 18%
chance Prospect Itself). The model of Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2007) has become the main model in appli-
cations of reference dependence, particularly in eco-
nomics. Our ﬁndings challenge this: ﬁrst, because we
ﬁnd that it is only used by a small fraction of subjects,
and second, because those subjects who use it are
particularly likely to violate ﬁrst-order stochastic
dominance.
There are several ways in which our study can be
extended. First, it may be interesting to explore whether
our results can be replicated for choices involving more
than just two prospects. Second, another extension
would be to look at prospects with continuous distri-
butions, which are often relevant in applied decision
analysis. Third, the minimum probability that we
included was 5%, whereas real-world decisions fre-
quently involve smaller probabilities (e.g., the annual
risk of contracting a fatal disease). It is, for instance,
unclear whether MaxMin would perform as well if
the lowest outcome occurred with only a very small
probability.
We did not test all reference points that have been
proposed in the literature. Aswe explained in Section 1,
we studied reference point rules that used the same
independent variables as the core theory of decision
under risk: expected utility. This implied, for example,
that we did not test explicitly for subjects’ goals (Heath
et al. 1999) or their aspirations (Diecidue and Van de
Ven 2008), because these require other inputs based on
introspection. We did not test reference point rules
that are based on previous choices either. Such rules
would introduce extra degrees of freedom, like which
information from these past choices to use, how far to
look back, and how to update the reference point
based on new information. The rules that we included
ﬁtted our subjects’ preferences well, and a large ma-
jority of our subjects (around 75%) could be sharply
classiﬁed, suggesting that they used one of the se-
lected rules.
In our paper, we have concentrated on decision under
risk, mainly because prospect theory was formulated
for this context. There is a rich literature that studies
reference dependence in other domains, such as time
preference (Loewenstein and Prelec 1992), consumer
choice (Tversky and Kahneman 1991), and marketing
(Winer 1986, Hardie et al. 1993, Kopalle and Winer
1996). It is not immediately obvious that our results
carry over to these domains. As mentioned above, none
of our reference point rules looked at previous choices.
Past experiences may be important, in intertemporal
choice, to understand habit formation and in consumer
choice, to determine reference prices. In marketing, past
prices and past purchases will probably shape reference
prices and reference alternatives. Studies of reference
points in choices between alternatives that have more
than one attribute (e.g., price and quality) face an addi-
tional challenge: is there a reference point for each attri-
bute, or is there a reference alternative (such as in Tversky
and Kahneman 1991 and Hardie et al. 1993) with which
multiattribute alternatives are compared?18 If there is a
reference point for each attribute, then it is straightfor-
ward to translate, for example,MaxMin tomultiattribute
choice. However, if there is a reference alternative, this
seems more complex.
8. Conclusion
Reference dependence is a key concept in explaining
people’s choices, but little insight exists into the ques-
tion of which reference point people use. Reference-
dependent theories give little guidance about this
question. This paper has estimated the prevalence
of six reference point rules using a unique data set in
which we used stakes up to a week’s salary. We
modeled the reference point rule as a latent categorical
variable, which we estimated using Bayesian hierar-
chical modeling. Our results indicate that the Status
Quo and MaxMin were the most commonly used
reference points. We found little support for the use
of a stochastic reference point, and at most, 20% of
our subjects used an expectations-based reference
point. Adding consumption utility does not improve
models with a choice-speciﬁc reference point (like
prospect theory), but adding probability weighting
improves models with a prospect-speciﬁc reference
point.
Table 6. Estimated Models
Model
Choice-speciﬁc
reference point
Prospect-speciﬁc
reference point
Consumption
utility
Probability
weighting
Consumption
utility
Probability
weighting
1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
2 No Yes Yes Yes
3 Yes Yes Yes No
4 No Yes Yes No
5 Yes No Yes No
6 No No Yes No
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Appendix A. The Experimental Questions and the
Predicted Reference Points
Table A.1 describes the 70 choices between prospects x 
(p1,x1;p2,x2;p3,x3;1−p1−p2−p3,x4) and y(q1,y1;q2,y2;q3,y3;
1−q1−q2−q3,y4) used in the experiment. The last ﬁve columns
give the choice-speciﬁc reference points of theMaxMin,MinMax,
and X atMax P rules and the prospect-speciﬁc reference points of
the Expected Value rule. The reference point of the Status Quo
Table A.1. Choices and Reference Points
No. x1 x2 x3 x4 p1 p2 p3 y1 y2 y3 y4 q1 q2 q3 MaxMin MinMax X at Max P
Expected value
x y
1 267 313 453 546 0.1 0.8 0.05 127 220 406 0.15 0.05 0.8 267 406 313 327.05 354.85
2 159 221 408 0.7 0.1 0.2 34 97 346 0.1 0.3 0.6 159 346 159 215 240.1
3 183 233 384 485 0.7 0.05 0.1 32 132 334 0.15 0.05 0.8 183 334 334 250.9 278.6
4 223 263 383 0.4 0.5 0.1 143 183 343 0.1 0.4 0.5 223 343 263 259 259
5 127 255 287 0.7 0.05 0.25 95 191 223 0.15 0.05 0.8 127 223 223 173.4 202.2
6 103 213 377 0.6 0.15 0.25 48 158 267 322 0.3 0.1 0.05 103 322 103 188 220.65
7 92 245 0.85 0.15 16 130 206 0.1 0.7 0.2 92 206 92 114.95 133.8
8 135 290 329 0.55 0.35 0.1 96 213 251 0.25 0.05 0.7 135 251 251 208.65 210.35
9 209 309 459 0.35 0.55 0.1 159 259 359 409 0.05 0.55 0.1 209 409 309 289 309
10 221 504 0.85 0.15 80 292 434 0.05 0.7 0.25 221 434 221 263.45 316.9
11 64 188 313 0.4 0.1 0.5 2 126 251 375 0.25 0.4 0.1 64 313 313 200.9 169.75
12 122 270 418 0.15 0.8 0.05 48 196 344 492 0.1 0.35 0.45 122 418 270 255.2 277.4
13 224 416 0.55 0.45 95 352 480 0.25 0.7 0.05 224 416 352 310.4 294.15
14 100 211 0.2 0.8 64 137 285 0.2 0.5 0.3 100 211 211 188.8 166.8
15 257 427 0.8 0.2 143 370 484 0.35 0.45 0.2 257 427 257 291 313.35
16 223 416 0.45 0.55 159 287 544 0.05 0.7 0.25 223 416 287 329.15 344.85
17 219 448 0.2 0.8 143 296 372 601 0.1 0.1 0.7 219 448 448 402.2 364.4
18 99 225 0.8 0.2 16 141 183 266 0.1 0.4 0.45 99 225 99 124.2 153.65
19 94 187 0.3 0.7 64 125 156 248 0.25 0.3 0.05 94 187 187 159.1 160.5
20 203 317 0.75 0.25 127 241 279 354 0.35 0.05 0.45 203 317 203 231.5 235.15
21 138 245 0.55 0.45 30 84 191 352 0.05 0.05 0.85 138 245 191 186.15 185.65
22 118 200 0.8 0.2 64 91 173 228 0.2 0.1 0.6 118 200 118 134.4 148.5
23 232 374 0.4 0.6 91 161 303 515 0.05 0.1 0.6 232 374 374 317.2 331.2
24 233 344 0.7 0.3 159 196 307 381 0.3 0.2 0.1 233 344 233 266.3 270
25 251 358 0.7 0.3 143 304 412 465 0.05 0.85 0.05 251 358 304 283.1 309.4
26 105 278 0.25 0.75 48 163 336 394 0.25 0.4 0.1 105 278 278 234.75 209.3
27 183 302 0.6 0.4 64 242 361 421 0.15 0.7 0.1 183 302 242 230.6 236.15
28 61 179 0.45 0.55 22 101 218 257 0.4 0.05 0.5 61 179 179 125.9 135.7
29 147 367 0.6 0.4 0 74 367 0.25 0.05 0.7 147 367 367 235 260.6
30 99 251 0.6 0.4 48 251 0.4 0.6 99 251 99 159.8 169.8
31 259 558 0.75 0.25 159 359 558 0.15 0.7 0.15 259 558 259 333.75 358.85
32 168 397 0.6 0.4 16 92 397 0.05 0.4 0.55 168 397 168 259.6 255.95
33 209 407 0.75 0.25 143 407 0.5 0.5 209 407 209 258.5 275
34 120 243 0.75 0.25 80 161 243 0.15 0.7 0.15 120 243 120 150.75 161.15
35 142 209 277 0.7 0.05 0.25 74 108 277 0.4 0.1 0.5 142 277 142 179.1 178.9
36 151 230 348 0.5 0.15 0.35 111 269 348 0.25 0.6 0.15 151 348 269 231.8 241.35
37 140 200 261 0.85 0.05 0.1 80 110 261 0.05 0.55 0.4 140 261 140 155.1 168.9
38 79 170 308 0.25 0.7 0.05 33 216 308 0.15 0.8 0.05 79 308 216 154.15 193.15
39 192 341 0.15 0.85 192 390 439 0.55 0.4 0.05 192 341 341 318.65 283.55
40 15 290 0.3 0.7 15 382 0.5 0.5 15 290 290 207.5 198.5
41 95 443 0.3 0.7 95 327 559 0.1 0.8 0.1 95 443 327 338.6 327
42 102 311 0.15 0.85 102 381 450 0.55 0.25 0.2 102 311 311 279.65 241.35
43 127 284 0.2 0.8 127 336 0.45 0.55 127 284 284 252.6 241.95
44 54 259 0.3 0.7 54 191 328 0.05 0.85 0.1 54 259 191 197.5 197.85
45 127 259 390 0.05 0.4 0.55 127 456 521 0.45 0.15 0.4 127 390 390 324.45 333.95
46 57 221 331 0.3 0.1 0.6 57 167 386 0.1 0.6 0.3 57 331 331 237.8 221.7
47 111 194 277 0.1 0.05 0.85 111 318 359 0.5 0.3 0.2 111 277 277 256.25 222.7
48 6 229 377 0.05 0.8 0.15 6 155 451 0.1 0.7 0.2 6 377 229 240.05 199.3
49 100 1 13 186 0.45 0.55 100 100 100 100 108.15
50 224 1 12 294 0.25 0.75 224 224 224 224 223.5
51 276 1 80 374 472 0.35 0.45 0.2 276 276 276 276 290.7
52 203 1 106 154 299 0.45 0.05 0.5 203 203 203 203 204.9
53 196 1 95 146 246 297 0.3 0.05 0.5 196 196 196 196 203.35
54 383 1 171 453 0.25 0.75 383 383 383 383 382.5
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rule is always zero, and the prospect-speciﬁc reference points
of the Prospect Itself rule were x and y themselves.
Appendix B. The Procedure to Construct the
Experimental Choices
The selection of experimental questions was guided by the
following contrasting principles.
• Questions must be diverse in terms of number of out-
comes and magnitudes of probabilities involved.
• Questions within each choice must have nonmatching
maximal or minimal outcomes.
• Questions must be diverse in terms of relative posi-
tioning in the outcome space (also known as shifting; see the
description below).
Table A.1. (Continued)
No. x1 x2 x3 x4 p1 p2 p3 y1 y2 y3 y4 q1 q2 q3 MaxMin MinMax X at Max P
Expected value
x y
55 297 404 0.55 0.45 189 243 350 511 0.05 0.05 0.85 297 404 350 345.15 344.65
56 220 338 0.45 0.55 181 260 377 416 0.4 0.05 0.5 220 338 338 284.9 294.7
57 238 329 467 0.25 0.7 0.05 192 375 467 0.15 0.8 0.05 238 467 375 313.15 352.15
58 301 368 436 0.7 0.05 0.25 233 267 436 0.4 0.1 0.5 301 436 301 338.1 337.9
59 259 1 172 345 0.45 0.55 259 259 259 259 267.15
60 362 1 265 313 458 0.45 0.05 0.5 362 362 362 362 363.9
61 213 418 0.3 0.7 213 350 487 0.05 0.85 0.1 213 418 350 356.5 356.85
62 223 347 472 0.4 0.1 0.5 161 285 410 534 0.25 0.4 0.1 223 472 472 359.9 328.75
63 306 526 0.6 0.4 159 233 526 0.25 0.05 0.7 306 526 526 394 419.6
64 251 358 0.7 0.3 143 304 412 465 0.05 0.85 0.05 251 358 304 283.1 309.4
65 95 443 0.3 0.7 95 327 559 0.1 0.8 0.1 95 443 327 338.6 327
66 223 416 0.45 0.55 159 287 544 0.05 0.7 0.25 223 416 287 329.15 344.85
67 209 407 0.75 0.25 143 407 0.5 0.5 209 407 209 258.5 275
68 138 245 0.55 0.45 30 84 191 352 0.05 0.05 0.85 138 245 191 186.15 185.65
69 111 207 223 0.5 0.4 0.1 80 95 207 0.1 0.4 0.5 111 207 111 160.6 149.5
70 111 175 207 0.1 0.4 0.5 80 159 191 0.25 0.25 0.5 111 191 207 184.6 155.25
Figure B.1. (Color online) Choices Used in the Experiment
Notes. Each subﬁgure represents a group of homogeneous choices. Each question consists of two prospects, blue (dark in black-and-white print)
and red (light). The x axis represents the amounts in euros, and the y axis has no quantitative meaning. Numbers below the prospect lines are the
outcome probabilities. Small squares are the expectations of the prospects. (a) Groupwith certainty equivalents. (b) Stochastic dominance group.
(c) Shifted group (extremes of blue (dark) prospect are shifted with respect to the red (light) prospect). (d) Minima of blue (dark) and red (light)
prospects coincide. (e) Maxima of blue (dark) and red (light) prospects coincide. (f)–(h) Three groups for which the range of the blue (dark) object
is inside the range of the red (light) prospect.
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• Questions must have similar expected value to avoid
trivial or statistically noninformative choice situations.
• Question pairs must be “orthogonal” in some sense to
maximize statistical efﬁciency.
Our question set (Table A.1) consists of six homogeneous
groups that are illustrated graphically in Figure B.1. The ﬁrst
group is a set of eight choices, where one of the prospects is
certain and the other option is a two- to four-outcome prospect
(Figure B.1(a)). The second set consists of two choices, where
one prospect stochastically dominates the other (Figure B.1(b)).
The third set comprises 10 choices, where one prospect is rel-
atively shifted—both minimum and maximum are relatively
higher than for the other prospect (Figure B.1(c)). The fourth
group consists of 12 choices for which the prospects in a choice
have the same minimum outcomes (Figure B.1(d)). The ﬁfth
group consists of 14 choices for which the prospects in a
choice have the same maximum outcome (Figure B.1(e)). The
last three groups (Figure B.1, (f)–(h)) consist of 24 choices, where
the range of one prospect is within the range of the other
prospect. This group is further split into three homogeneous
subgroups determined by the number of outcomes in the
smaller prospect (two versus three) and the shift of the smaller
prospect with respect to the bigger one (one or two outcomes).
Choices in all groups are roughly balanced with respect to the
relative shift (there are both one outcome- and two outcome-
shifted questions on either side of the prospects).
To maximize statistical efﬁciency and minimize re-
dundancy, within each group of questions we perform the
exhaustive search that minimizes the sum of the pairwise
crosschoice covariance within that group. We deﬁned the
crosschoice covariance for a choice pair (A1,B1), (A2,B2) as((cor(A1,A2) + cor(B1,B2))
2
)2
.
This is an intuitive counterpart of the statistical covariance. For
each subgroupof choices,we optimized the sum of all pairwise
crosschoice covariances within that group.
Appendix C. Details of the Bayesian Hierarchical
Estimation Procedure
The vector of the observed choices (data) of individual i is
denoted byDi  (Di1, . . . ,Di70). Each of the 139 subjects in the
experiment had his own parameter vector Bi  (αi,λi,γi, ξi).
We assumed that each parameter in Bi came from a log-
normal distribution: αi ~ logN(µα, σ2α), λi ~ logN(µλ, σ2λ), γi ~
logN(µγ, σ2γ), and ξi ~ logN(µξ, σ2ξ). Thus, the complete vec-
tor of unknown parameters at the population level is θG 
(µα,µλ,µγ,µξ, σ2α, σ2λ, σ2γ, σ2ξ). For the hyperpriors, π*  (µ*,
σ2* ), *∈ {α,λ,γ,ξ} of the parent distributions, we made the
usual assumption of conjugate NormalGamma prior: the µ*
follow a normal distribution (conditional on σ*), and the σ2*
follow an inverse Gamma distribution. We centered the
hyperpriors at linearity (expected value) and chose the vari-
ances such that the hyperpriors were diffuse and would have
a negligible impact on the posterior estimation.
The joint probability distribution of the behavioral pa-
rameters B  (B1, . . . .,B139) and θB is
P
(
B,θB
⃒⃒
πB
)  (∏139
i1
P
(
Bi
⃒⃒
θB
))
P θB
⃒⃒
πB
)
.
(
(C.1)
Given reference point rule RPi, the likelihood of subject i’s
responses is
P
(
Di
⃒⃒
Bi,RPi
) ∏70
q1
P
(
Di,q
⃒⃒
Bi,RPi
)
. (C.2)
The probability of each choice Di,q is computed using
Luce’s (1959) choice rule (Equation (9)). From Equations (C.1)
and (C.2), it follows that the joint probability distribution of
all of the unknown behavioral parameters B and θB and all of
the observed choices D  (D1, . . . ,D139) is
P
(
D,B,θB
⃒⃒
RP,πB
) 
(
∏
139
i1
∏
70
q1
P
(
Di,q
⃒⃒
Bi,RPi
))
·
(
∏
139
i1
P
(
Bi
⃒⃒
θB
))
P
(
θB
⃒⃒
πB
)
. (C.3)
In Equation (C.3), RP  (RP1, . . . ,RP139) is the vector of
individual speciﬁc reference point rules.
For each of the six reference point rules of Table 1, we
estimated the posterior probability that a subject used it given
the data: P(RPi
⃒⃒
D). RPi is a (six-dimensional) categorical
variable. For categorical variables, it is common to use the
Dirichlet distribution: θRP ~Dirichlet(πRP), where θRP is a
probability vector in a six-dimensional simplex and πRP is
a diffuse hyperprior parameter for the Dirichlet distribu-
tion. Then, the joint probability density of RP and θRP
becomes
P
(
RP,θRP
⃒⃒
πRP
)  (∏139
i1
P
(
RPi
⃒⃒
θRP
))
P
(
θRP
⃒⃒
πRP
)
. (C.4)
Combining Equations (C.3) and (C.4) gives the complete
speciﬁcation of our statistical model:
P
(
D,B,θB,RP,θRP
⃒⃒
πB,πRP
)

(
∏
139
i1
∏
70
q1
P
(
Di,q
⃒⃒
Bi,RPi
))(
∏
139
i1
P
(
Bi
⃒⃒
θB
))
·
(
∏
139
i1
P
(
RPi
⃒⃒
θRP
))
P
(
θB
⃒⃒
πB
)
P
(
θRP
⃒⃒
πRP
)
. (C.5)
To compute the marginal posterior distributions P(Bi
⃒⃒
D,
πB,πRP), P(RPi
⃒⃒
D,πB,πRP), P(θB
⃒⃒
D,πB,πRP), and P(θRP
⃒⃒
D,πB,
πRP), we used Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
sampling (Gelfand and Smith 1990) with blocked Gibbs
sampling.19 We ﬁrst used 10,000 burn-in iterations with ada
ptive MCMC and then, 20,000 standard MCMC burn-in
iterations. The results are based on the subsequent 50,000
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iterations, of which the ﬁrst 15,000 iterations were used for
warmup until convergence was achieved and the last 35,000
iterations were used for the reported estimations.
Appendix D. IBeta
The incomplete regularized β function (IBeta) is a very ﬂexible
monotonically increasing [0, 1]→ [0, 1] function. It can
capture a wide range of convex, concave, S-,shape and inverse
S-shaped functions without favoring speciﬁc shapes or
inﬂection points. The family is symmetric in the sense that
IBeta(x; a, b)  1 − IBeta(1 − x; a, b). Various shapes of IBeta
function are illustrated in Figure C.1.
Endnotes
1Examples of real-world evidence for reference dependence are the
equity premium puzzle, the ﬁnding that stock returns are too high
relative to bond returns (Benartzi and Thaler 1995), the disposition
effect, the ﬁnding that investors hold losing stocks and property too
long and sell winners too early (Odean 1998, Genesove and Mayer
2001), default bias in pension and insurance choice (Samuelson and
Zeckhauser 1988, Thaler and Benartzi 2004) as well as organ donation
Figure C.1. (Color online) Various Shapes of the IBeta Function
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(Johnson and Goldstein 2003), the excessive buying of insurance
(Sydnor 2010), the annuitization puzzle, the fact that at retirement
people allocate too little of their wealth to annuities (Benartzi et al.
2011), the behavior of professional golf players (Pope and Schweitzer
2011) and poker players (Eil and Lien 2014), and the bunching of
marathonﬁnishing times just ahead of roundnumbers (Allen et al. 2017).
2 For example, different assumptions about the reference point are
required to explain two well-known anomalies from ﬁnance: the
equity premiumpuzzle demands that the reference point adjusts over
time, whereas adjustments in the reference point weaken the dis-
position effect (Meng and Weng 2018).
3 For example, Abeler et al. (2011), Card and Dahl (2011), Crawford
and Meng (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012), and Bartling et al. (2015).
4 For example, Baucells et al. (2011), Heffetz and List (2014), Lien and
Zheng (2015), Wenner (2015), and Allen et al. (2017).
5To illustrate, in the online appendix, we show that the data of Abeler
et al. (2011), which they interpret as supporting the model of Ko¨szegi
and Rabin (2007), are also consistent with the MaxMin rule that we
study in this paper.
6This contrasts with the standard practice in mixture modeling,
where differentmodels are aggregated through amixing distribution.
In mixture models, the formal speciﬁcation and parameterization of
the submodels can differ substantially.
7When we refer to prospect theory, we mean cumulative prospect
theory, the version that Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed in
their 1992 article in the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty.
8 If consumption utility was excluded, the CPE model of Ko¨szegi and
Rabin (2007) implies that any prospect that gives xwith probability 1
has a value of zero, regardless of the size of x. Therefore, the decision
maker should be indifferent between $1 for sure and $1,000 for sure.
Consumption utility prevents this.
9With nonlinear v.
10This rule was suggested in an unpublished working paper by
Bleichrodt and Schmidt (2005). See also Birnbaum and Schmidt (2010)
and Schneider and Day (2018).
11The equivalence with Loomes and Sugden (1986) follows, because
we assume that v(x)  x.
12Cox et al. (2015) found evidence against isolation.
13 In the probabilistic graphical models literature, such dependency
relationships are known as “V-structures” B→D←R. B and R are
unconditionally independent (B’R) but dependent conditionally on
D (B’/ R
⃒⃒
D).
14Note that the medians need not add to 100%.
15Terzi et al. (2016) compared four expectations-based reference points
and found that around 40% of their subjects used no reference point
or used multiple reference points. This is higher than the proportion of
our subjects who could not be sharply classiﬁed in our study. The
difference can be explained by the larger and broader set of reference
point rules in our study.
16The Prelec one-parameter probability weighting function only al-
lows for inverse or S-shapedweighting. However, the two-parameter
Prelec function and the IBeta function allow for all shapes, and their
estimated shapes were also inverse S.
17 In their 1975 working paper version of prospect theory, Kahneman
and Tversky (1975, p. 15) write that [U] “is a function in two ar-
guments: current wealth and magnitudes of change. It seems,
however, that the preference relation between gambles is relatively
insensitive to wealth and highly sensitive to changes.”
18 See Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003) and Bleichrodt et al. (2009)
for theoretical analyses of reference dependence in multiattribute
utility.
19 For the behavioral parameters B1, . . . ,B139, we used Metropolis–
HastingMCMCwith symmetric normal proposal on the log scale. For
the block RP1, . . . ,RP139, we used Metropolis–Hasting MCMC with
uniform proposal, and the group-level blocks θG and θRP were
sampled directly from the conjugate NormalGamma and Dirichlet–
Categorical distributions, respectively.
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